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I. INTRODUCTION
The short answer is: Yes, a city council can give praise to a deity-at
least through the medium of prayer offered at a council meeting to a generic
"God." But can such a prayer be addressed to, say, "our Lord, Jesus Christ"?
The answer to that question is far from clear, as the disparate decisions ren-
dered by federal appellate courts in two recent cases demonstrate.'
II. A TALE OF Two COUNTY COMMISSIONS
In a decision rendered in 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that even sectarian prayers are constitutionally
permissible at governmental meetings, as long as the governmental entity has
not acted with the impermissible motive of advancing a particular religious
belief or affiliating the government with a specific faith.2 The result of that
decision was the rejection of an Establishment Clause challenge, brought by
* B.A., Columbia, 1968; J.D., Harvard, 1971; Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad Law Center, since 1976.
1. Compare Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. de-
nied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), with Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty. (Pelphrey III), 547 F.3d 1263, 1278
(11th Cir. 2008).
2. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1271-74, 1278.
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citizens and taxpayers of Cobb County, Georgia, in the following circums-
tances:
Both the Cobb County Commission and the Cobb County Planning
Commission have a long tradition of opening their meetings with a
prayer offered by volunteer clergy or other members of the com-
munity. The clergy have represented a variety of faiths, including
Christianity, Islam, Unitarian Universalism, and Judaism, and their
diverse prayers have, at times, included expressions of their reli-
gious faiths.
... The majority of the speakers are Christian .... The taxpayers
contend that, between 1998 and 2005, 96.6[%] of the clergy . . .
were Christian. During the same period, adherents to the Jewish,
Unitarian Universalist, Muslim, and Baha'i faiths also provided
invocations.
. . . Over the past decade, 70[%] of prayers before the County
Commission and 68[%] of prayers before the Planning Commis-
sion contained Christian references. Often the prayers ended with
references to "our Heavenly Father" or "in Jesus' name we pray."
Prayers also contained occasional references to the Jewish and
Muslim faiths, such as references to Passover, Hebrew prayers, Al-
lah, and Mohammed.
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the Forsyth County-North Carolina-Board of Commissioners
was acting in violation of the Establishment Clause in the following circums-
tances:
On December 17, 2007, [plaintiffs] decided to attend a meet-
ing of the Forsyth County Board of [County] Commissioners.
Like all public Board meetings, the gathering began with an invo-
cation delivered by a local religious leader. And like almost every
previous invocation, that prayer closed with the phrase, "For we do
make this prayer in Your Son Jesus' name, Amen."
3. Id. at 1266-67.
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. . . [T]he prayers frequently contained references to Jesus Christ;
indeed, at least half of the prayers offered between January 2006
and February 2007 contained concluding phrases such as "We pray
this all in the name under whom is all authority, the Lord Jesus
Christ," "[I]t's in Jesus' name that we pray[,] Amen," and "We
thank You, we praise You, and we give Your name glory, and we
ask it all in Your Son Jesus' name."
. . . [T]he prayers repeatedly continued to reference specific tenets
of Christianity. These were not isolated occurrences: between
May 29, 2007 and December 15, 2008, almost four-fifths of the
prayers referred to "Jesus," "Jesus Christ," "Christ," or "Savior."
In particular, most of the prayers closed by mentioning Jesus ...
[n]one of the prayers mentioned non-Christian deities.4
The purpose of this essay is to briefly explain and evaluate these deci-
sions.
III. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A. Lemon
Beginning in 1971, in a case known as Lemon v. Kurtzman 5 the Su-
preme Court of the United States has, most often, in cases involving Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to government actions, required the government
to establish that it acted with a secular purpose, that the primary effect of the
challenged action is not the advancement of religion, and that the challenged
action has not resulted in "excessive entanglement" between government and
religion.6 If the government does not prevail with respect to each prong of
this test-known forever after as the Lemon test-it loses.' Note, too, that it
is not a required element of an Establishment Clause violation that a go-
vernmental actor be found to have promoted, or advanced, a particular reli-
gion-although such a finding would almost surely lead to a finding of un-
4. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 342-44.
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-13. The test has been modified in recent years, but remains essentially the
same. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864-65 (2005), cert denied, 131
S. Ct. 1474 (2011); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
7. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
2012] 483
3
Rohr: Can the City Council Praise the Lord? Some Ruminations About Pray
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAWREVIEW
constitutionality;8 the promotion or advancement of religion in general will
suffice.'
B. Marsh
In a 1983 decision, Marsh v. Chambers,'o however, the Supreme Court
of the United States-without applying the Lemon test-rejected an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the offering of prayers, by a paid chaplain, at
the start of each day of a state legislative session." If the Supreme Court had
applied the Lemon test in Marsh, answers to one or more of the following
questions would have been dispositive: Is the offering of a prayer motivated
by a religious purpose?l 2 Is its primary effect the advancement of religion?
Does the practice of bringing members of the clergy to government meet-
ings, for the purpose of offering religious invocations, result in excessive
"entanglement" of church and state? The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
believed that the answer to each of these questions was clearly "yes" -as
did the Supreme Court Justices who dissented in Marsh'4 -but the majority
felt no need to even address those questions.'" Instead, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, relied on historical practice, particularly the fact that
the very first Congress in 1789 adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to
open each legislative session with a prayer.16 "Clearly," he concluded, "the
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amend-
8. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). "The clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another." Id.
9. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
10. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
11. Id. at 784-85, 792-95.
12. Note that Justice O'Connor later argued, more than once, that "[p]ractices such as
legislative prayers . . . serve the secular purposes of 'solemnizing public occasions' and 'ex-
pressing confidence in the future."' Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Such practices, she wrote, were examples of
"ceremonial deism," which, by virtue of their "longstanding existence" and "nonsectarian
nature," "do not convey a message of endorsement of particular religious beliefs." Id. at 630-
31; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35-37 (2004) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). But note that she spoke explicitly of "nonsectarian" religious references. See
Cnty. ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
14. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 784-86, 792-94 (majority opinion).
16. Id. at 786-88.
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ment."17 Prayers in public schools, of course, had already been found to vi-
olate the Establishment Clause, 8 and would be again,' 9 but there was no
eighteenth century precedent for these practices, as there was for "legisla-
tive" prayer.2 0 Thus, the practice was constitutional.2' While commentators
continue to criticize this decision,22 there is no reason to believe that it is
likely to be overruled.
C. Endorsement
Another important component of contemporary Establishment Clause
doctrine, which emerged a year after the Marsh decision, should also be
noted: The introduction, by Justice O'Connor, of the principle that the Es-
tablishment Clause should be understood as primarily posing a bar to gov-
ernment "endorsement" of religion. 23 "Endorsement," she wrote, "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the po-
litical community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."2 Thus, government
action would violate the Establishment Clause if it had either the purpose or
effect of conveying a message of endorsing religion.25 She later clarified that
this determination was to be made through the eyes of "an objective observ-
er."2 6 Although this "endorsement" test-as it is now understood-found its
first expression in a concurring opinion, its influence was detectable in Su-
preme Court majority opinions almost immediately.2 7
17. Id. at 788.
18. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433, 436 (1962).
19. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315, 317 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
20. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-88.
21. Id. at 795.
22. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REv. 972, 976-77 (2010) ("Religious liberty, within the sphere of
legislative prayer, thus becomes a perverse sort of zero-sum game-no matter how it is done,
someone's religious liberty will inevitably be lost as a consequence. The only way to really
protect religious liberty, it seems, is by not having legislative prayer at all."); Eric J. Segall,
Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and the Establishment Clause,
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 725 (2009).
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
2012] 485
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If this test were to be applied, might not the offering of a prayer at a city
council meeting be perceived, by an objective observer, as an endorsement of
religion, particularly if the prayer makes reference to the beliefs of a particu-
lar religion?
IV. DOES MARSH GOVERN?
Because of the Marsh decision, lower courts have agreed that prayers,
benedictions, and invocations can be offered at the start of meetings of the
governing bodies of cities and counties, as well as at state legislative ses-
sions.28 This is a key threshold determination, because the generally applica-
ble Lemon and endorsement tests would presumably govern the question at
hand if the reasoning of the decision in Marsh-a case involving the utter-
ance of prayers at sessions of a state legislature, resolved on the basis of the
age-old practice of our national legislature-were found to be inapplicable at
the local legislative level.29
Should Marsh apply at the local level, or not? Again, the general as-
sumption by lower courts is that it does.30 But Judge Middlebrooks, dissent-
ing in the Cobb County case, took the position that Marsh-"an outlier in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence"-should not govern prayers at govern-
ment meetings at the local level.31 Prayers at meetings of the county com-
missions involved in this case, he argued, "hardly can be considered part of
the fabric of this nation's history."32 He pointed out, in addition, that the
county commission-in contrast to a state legislature-performed executive
and adjudicative, as well as legislative, functions, 33 contrasting a state legis-
lative session "with a county commission acting in a quasi-adjudicative role,
deciding whether to terminate an employee, suspend a liquor license, or grant
a zoning variance. A citizen seeking relief has little choice but to attend."3
28. See the summary of the relevant case law in Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1272-74
(II th Cir. 2008). But a federal appellate court recently held that the Marsh legislative prayer
exception did not apply to meetings of a school board which students routinely attended. Doe
v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012).
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784, 787-88 (1983); see, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1275. But see Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 380-81, 383 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding Marsh inapplicable to school
board meetings).
31. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1286 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1287.
34. Id. at 1288.
486 [Vol. 36
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I would expand upon Judge Middlebrooks' arguments by adding the
following two pertinent contentions. The first is that the core reasoning of
Marsh-i.e., that the practice of the first Congress provides strong evidence
that the generation that drafted and ratified the Establishment Clause did not
believe that the utterance of prayers at legislative sessions violated the
Clause 3 5-- does not apply at the local level because the framers had no reason
to consider the applicability of the Clause at the local level."6 The second-
concededly offered without the benefit of empirical research-is that a meet-
ing of a local "legislature" is qualitatively different from a meeting of a state
or national legislative body. There may be some citizens "in the gallery" at a
state or national legislative session, but ordinary citizens are far more likely
to be in attendance-perhaps regularly, perhaps only occasionally-at
monthly meetings of city or county commissions, not only because they may
have business before the commission, as Judge Middlebrooks noted, but also
because it is common for such a local legislative body to provide the oppor-
tunity for attending citizens to address the commission. 37 Arguably, these
experiential differences-between local legislative entities, on the one hand,
and state and national legislatures, on the other-ought to make a difference
with respect to the applicability of Marsh;3 8 an aberrational legal principle
based solely on a historical practice should not be lightly extended to apply
to situations not wholly analogous to that historical antecedent.3 9
The majority in the Cobb County case, however, was not persuaded that
state and local governments should ever be treated differently, for Establish-
ment Clause purposes.4 0
V. THE LIMITS OF MARSH
Assuming, as the court in Pelphrey v. Cobb County (Pelphrey IJJ)41
held, that Marsh does control the issue of prayer at local government meet-
ings,42 what limitations apply, with respect to the content of such prayers?
35. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1983).
36. Indeed, it is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution initially had no
application to state and local governments. Not until 1940 did the Supreme Court declare that
the Establishment Clause was "incorporated" into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thereby applicable to state and local governments. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
37. See Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1287-88 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).
38. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88.
39. See id. at 786-89.
40. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1275-76.
41. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).
42. Id. at 1271.
2012] 487
7
Rohr: Can the City Council Praise the Lord? Some Ruminations About Pray
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Again, Marsh provides an answer.43 The majority in Marsh was untroubled
by the fact that the Nebraska legislature had, for sixteen years, paid a cler-
gyman of one denomination (Presbyterian) to offer prayers which, according
to the chaplain, were "nonsectarian" and "Judeo Christian"-whatever that
might mean-in nature." The court indicated, as well, that the chaplain
"removed all references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legis-
lator." 45 These facts led Chief Justice Burger to utter the following, fateful
sentence: "The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as
here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief."46
That sentence embodies the key consideration in lower court cases involving
prayers at local government meetings. 47 But what does it mean?
It might be understood to mean that "nonsectarian" prayers are permiss-
ible at such meetings, but that sectarian prayers are not.48 But Judge Pryor,
writing for the majority in the Pelphrey III case, rejected that interpretation
as "contrary to the command of Marsh that courts are not to evaluate the
content of the prayers absent evidence of exploitation."49 The Supreme
Court, he added, "never held that the prayers in Marsh were constitutional
because they were 'nonsectarian.'"' 0 "The 'nonsectarian' nature of the ...
prayers [in Marsh, he maintained,] was one factor in [a] fact-intensive analy-
sis.""i In rejecting this suggested dividing line, Judge Pryor went so far as to
say that "[w]e would not know where to begin to demarcate the boundary
between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions," observing that even plain-
tiffs' counsel had difficulty, during oral argument, in deciding whether "king
of kings" was a sectarian reference.52
43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
44. Id. at 793 & n.14.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 794-95.
47. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 394-95, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 191, 202 (5th Cir. 2006); Wynne
v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 294, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2004).
48. Indeed, a few federal appellate courts had, prior to the Eleventh Circuit ruling in
Pelphrey III, interpreted Chief Justice Burger's language that way. See Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at
399-400; Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d at 202; Wynne, 376 F.3d at 299-300; see also
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (discuss-
ing Marsh); Lund, supra note 22, at 1000.
49. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008).
50. Id. (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1272.
[Vol. 36488
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In the Joyner ruling, however, the majority of the three-judge appellate
panel appears to have interpreted Marsh quite differently." Judge Wilkin-
son, virtually at the outset of his opinion, stated that "both Supreme Court
precedent and our own . . . establish that in order to survive constitutional
scrutiny, invocations must consist of the type of nonsectarian prayers that
solemnize the legislative task and seek to unite rather than divide."54 Later in
the opinion, he asserted that "[t]he cases ... seek to minimize these risks"-
the appearance of religious preference and sectarian strife-"by requiring
legislative prayers to embrace a nonsectarian ideal." Still later, he quoted
with approval a statement in an amicus brief that "the exception created by
Marsh is limited to the sort of nonsectarian legislative prayer that solemnizes
the proceedings of legislative bodies without advancing or disparaging a
particular faith." Admittedly, Judge Wilkinson distinguished, rather than
disapproved of, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pelphrey III, pointing to
the fact that invocations in Cobb County occasionally featured non-Christian
references, whereas no such non-Christian references had found their way
into Forsyth County Commission meetings during the time period in ques-
tion.57 It must also be acknowledged that Judge Wilkinson's opinion leaves
the reader with some uncertainty as to exactly what is, and is not, forbidden
in terms of the content of future Forsyth County prayers." Still, the Fourth
Circuit appears to have embraced the "sectarian/nonsectarian" distinction
that the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally rejected. 9
53. See Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 347-49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
54. Id. at 342.
55. Id. at 347.
56. Id. at 349 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty at 13, Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1232)).
57. See id. at 352-53.
58. The appellate court affirmed the district court's issuance of "a declaratory judgment
that the 'invocation policy, as implemented, violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitu-
tion' and an injunction against the Board 'continuing the Policy as it is now implemented."'
Joyner, 653 F.3d at 345, 355. Moreover, Judge Wilkinson, immediately after stating that
"legislative prayer[s] must strive to be nondenominational so long as that is reasonably possi-
ble," said this: "Infrequent references to specific deities, standing alone, do not suffice to
make out a constitutional case. But legislative prayers that go further-prayers in a particular
venue that repeatedly suggest the government has put its weight behind a particular faith-
transgress the boundaries of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 349. That statement arguably
implies that Judge Wilkinson was not in fact insisting upon a strict avoidance of all sectarian
prayers. See id.
59. Id. at 348, 354-55. Judge Wilkinson said nothing regarding the feasibility of such a
demarcation, despite the fact that Judge Niemeyer, dissenting, complained that "there is no
clear definition of what constitutes a 'sectarian' prayer." Id. at 364 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
20121 489
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So, is the distinction between "sectarian" and "nonsectarian" prayers in
fact an unworkable one, as the Eleventh Circuit panel concluded?60 "Secta-
rian" is a word with clear meaning.61 Would it perhaps be appropriate to
treat, as "nonsectarian"-and thus permissible-any word or combination of
words like, "king of kings"-which is 1) a common noun-like "lord"-or
adjective-like "heavenly," 2) not generally capitalized, and 3) capable of
usage outside of a religious or historical context? The word "god," even
when capitalized, could be viewed as nonsectarian as well.62 A sectarian
reference, in contrast, typically takes the form of a proper noun-or possibly
an adjective-that is always capitalized-such as "Jesus," "Jehovah," "Al-
lah," or "Buddha." 63  On the other hand, a combination of nonsectarian
words, like "the father, the son, and the holy ghost," may have attained secta-
rian meaning. The matter is thus not entirely subject to bright-line rules, but
does that fact render the distinction unworkable?"
Furthermore, if the distinction between sectarian and nonsectarian ref-
erences does not provide the limiting principle in this context, what does?
The majority in Pelphrey III latched onto the precise language of Marsh,
which again, indicated that legislative prayers would violate the Establish-
ment Clause only if the offering of such prayers "has been exploited to
proselytize or advance" a single religion, and concluded:
The district court did not clearly err when it found that the
County did not exploit the prayers to advance one faith by using
predominantly Christian speakers. Although the majority of
speakers were Christian, the parties agree that prayers were also
60. A powerful argument that the distinction is "illusory" is found in Robert J. Delahun-
ty, "Varied Carols": Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 517,
522-26 (2007) ("However inclusionary or ecumenical a prayer is intended to be, it necessarily
incorporates a particular theological viewpoint or belief . . . ."). But see Lund, supra note 22,
at 1001 ("It is true that there is no clear boundary between sectarian and nonsectarian prayers.
But that does not make the nonsectarian standard incoherent or meaningless.").
61. It is defined, most pertinently, as "confined to the limits of one religious group, one
school, or one party." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2052 (3d ed.
2002).
62. See id. at 973, 2052. Note that the word "god" is defined in Webster's Dictionary-
without capitalization-as, inter alia, "one who wields great or despotic power." Id. at 973.
63. See Lund, supra note 22, at 1005 (quoting Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2008)).
64. Professor Lund suggests "a possible response to Judge Pryor" as follows: "Religious
language objectionable to any of the three major monotheistic religions (Christians, Jews, and
Muslims) is overly sectarian and unconstitutional; language acceptable to all three religions is
nonsectarian and constitutional." Id. at 1006.
65. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227,
1233-34 (10th Cir. 1998)); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
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offered by members of the Jewish, Unitarian, and Muslim faiths.
This diversity of speakers ... supports the finding that the County
did not exploit the prayers to advance any one religion. The
speakers . . . represented "a wide cross-section of the County's re-
ligious leaders."
The finding that the diverse references in the prayers, viewed
cumulatively, did not advance a single faith also was not clearly
erroneous. The Xrayers included references from Christianity and
other faiths ....
More guidance, as to the meaning of this "exploitation" concept, may
possibly be derived from the thoughtful opinion of Judge Story, whose ruling
in Pelphrey v. Cobb County (Pelphrey 1)67 at the district court level was af-
firmed by the Eleventh Circuit.68 Judge Story made clear-as Judge Pryor
did not-that "exploitation" was all about legislative motive:
Marsh identifies as the focus of the Establishment Clause analysis
the purpose or intent of the legislature, rather than the effects of its
practices. . . . In this way, . . . Marsh deems the purposeful prefe-
rence of one religious view to the exclusion of others as the prima-
ry evil to be avoided in the arena of legislative prayer.
Judge Story was open, it seemed, to finding such an impermissible purpose
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, as he explained, "[w]here the invoca-
tion of sectarian concepts or beliefs, viewed from a cumulative perspective,
reaches a certain level of ubiquity and exclusivity, the appearance of a legis-
lative preference for one particular faith may well become constitutionally
intolerable."70 But he was not led to that conclusion in this case, and the
Eleventh Circuit panel found no clear error in that regard.7 1
Fairly obviously, that approach raises difficult questions as to how
many religions must be represented at such meetings, and how frequently, in
order to dispel the suggestion of impermissible preference.7 2 Is a municipali-
66. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1277 (citation omitted).
67. 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
68. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1266-67.
69. Pelphrey 1, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
70. Id. at 1339.
71. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1277-78 (citing Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., (Pelphrey II), 448
F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368-70 (N.D. Ga. 2006)).
72. Professor Lund, critiquing Pelphrey III, said this:
It ends up suggesting that the presence of a few non-Christian references or speakers saves a
legislative prayer program, regardless of how frequent the Christian references are. . . . If such
2012] 491
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ty on safe ground if only Christian and Jewish clergy are invited to deliver
prayers, if other religions have a presence in the city? If not, must every
such religion be given its opportunity to offer such prayers, or only those
with a sufficient number of adherents in the local population-and, if so,
what number might that be? Moreover, if the city's practice is evaluated on
a calendar-year basis, does the selection of a non-Christian prayer leader
once during that year supply enough diversity to defeat an inference of pur-
poseful preference for Christianity? Would the answer depend on the demo-
graphics of the municipality? If not, how many such opportunities would
suffice?7 3
The matter of how visiting clergy are selected has also arisen, in cases
addressing these issues.74 Indeed, in Pelphrey v. Cobb County (Pelphrey II)71
itself, at the district court level, it was found that the County Planning Com-
mission had, at one point in time, engaged in a constitutionally unacceptable
method of selecting clergy, because representatives of "certain faiths were
categorically excluded . . . based on the content of their faith."" The Ele-
venth Circuit upheld that finding, but emphasized that "[t]he 'impermissible
motive' standard does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to
pray. The standard instead prohibits purposeful discrimination."
In an earlier Fourth Circuit case from Virginia involving this issue, a
county resident who identified herself as a "witch" (or wiccan) asked to be
added to the list of religious leaders available to deliver invocations at meet-
ings of the county board of supervisors. When her request was denied, she
brought suit.79 The district court held that "the [c]ounty had engaged in [an]
impermissible denominational preference," but the court of appeals re-
versed.o Given the fact that the Nebraska Legislature's employment of a
single Presbyterian minister was deemed constitutional in Marsh," along
with the fact that Chesterfield County had invited a diverse group of clergy
token diversity is all that the Establishment Clause requires, state[] and local governments will
have no real problem. But little will be left of the requirement of denominational neutrality.
Lund, supra note 22, at 1013.
73. Professor Segall has raised similar questions. Segall, supra note 22, at 734.
74. See, e.g., Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 284, 287
(4th Cir. 2005); Pelphrey II, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
75. 448 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
76. Id. at 1373-74.
77. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11 th Cir. 2008).
78. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279.
79. Id. at 280.
80. Id. at 280, 288.
81. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983).
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to its meetings, the court's rejection of a requirement of all-inclusiveness is
82not surprising.
Indeed, there appears to be no established requirement of all-
inclusiveness with regard to represented religions, in this context. In the
Eleventh Circuit, under Pelphrey III, there is only a ban on purposeful exclu-
sivity.83 But, in determining whether a municipality has crossed the line and
entered the realm of impermissible preference, it seems likely that courts will
have to address the kinds of "diversity" questions that I have raised herein.
Might it not be more challenging for a municipality to try to achieve a satis-
factory balance, in terms of religions represented and frequency of inclusion,
than it would be to simply insist on the delivery of only nonsectarian pray-
ers-a policy that would reduce the significance of who utters the prayer?8
VI. EMPHASIZING THE "ENDORSEMENT" PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court is quite unlikely to overrule Marsh, but even a Su-
preme Court generally regarded as primarily "conservative""8 could conceiv-
ably revisit its holding in Marsh and refine it in light of its later-developed
"endorsement" concept; a refinement that would clarify Marsh as permitting
only nonsectarian prayers at legislative sessions and meetings.86 This would
be consistent with Marsh, because the chaplain in Marsh, as noted above,
described his prayers as "nonsectarian" and had abandoned explicitly Chris-
tian references in his prayers.
The endorsement concept is arguably relevant here, even though it is
not presently applied-given the court's exclusive reliance on Marsh-in the
82. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279.
83. Pelphrey Ill, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11 th Cir. 2008).
84. Again quoting Professor Lund: "The nonsectarian standard has virtues and vices ....
Its chief virtue is that it seems the only workable solution to the problem of denominational
exclusivity." Lund, supra note 22, at 1023. But here, Professor Delahunty is the optimist,
contending that a sufficiently pluralistic approach to diversity of religious speakers can ensure
that legislative prayer does not result in religious preference. Delahunty, supra note 60, at
561-68.
85. As of this writing, four members of the Court have yet to directly address (as Su-
preme Court Justices) any substantive Establishment Clause issue. Justice Kennedy, moreo-
ver, while usually allied with two Justices who have rarely-if ever-found violations of the
Establishment Clause, has parted company with them in school prayer cases. See e.g., Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Justice Kennedy has, however, argued
against the use of the "endorsement" test. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. See id. at 595 (majority opinion).
87. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983).
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legislative-prayer context. " Recall Justice O'Connor's explanation that go-
vernmental endorsement of religion is constitutionally impermissible because
it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community."" I think it very likely that a Jewish resident of
a city, attending even a single meeting of the city commission-much less
repeated instances of the same experience-at which a Christian minister
voices his thanks to "Jesus Christ," would feel like an "outsider." I think it
quite possible, too, that a Muslim resident of the city, attending a rare city
council meeting at which a Jewish rabbi delivered the invocation, would
experience a reinforcement of his belief that only Christians and Jews really
matter in America. Admittedly, in each of these instances, these feelings of
alienation might be alleviated if the Jew or the Muslim knew that his or her
religion would be represented at a future meeting of the city council; but it
might not be represented, or he or she might not know that it would, or it
might not make him or her feel any better about the situation.
In his majority opinion in the Joyner case, Judge Wilkinson displayed
welcome sensitivity to such concerns, saying this:
Take-all-comers policies that do not discourage sectarian prayer
will inevitably favor the majoritarian faith in the community at the
expense of religious minorities living therein. This effect creates
real burdens on citizens-particularly those who attend meetings
only sporadically-for they will have to listen to someone profess-
ing religious beliefs that they do not themselves hold as a condi-
tion of attendance and participation. 90
A reinterpretation of Marsh, to allow only nonsectarian prayers, would
eliminate such unnecessary feelings of alienation.91 Unless Marsh is over-
turned, of course, there will be no judicial relief forthcoming for sensitive
atheists.
VII. CONCLUSION
For now, however, in the Eleventh Circuit, the looser standard of the
Pelphrey III decision governs. But, of course, to say that a municipality is
88. See Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1275, 1277.
89. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 354 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1097 (2012); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 28
(2d Cir. 2012); Mullin v. Sussex County, No. I1-580-LPS, 2012 WL 1753662, at *10-11 (D.
Del. May 15, 2012).
91. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-95.
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free, under our Constitution, to engage in a certain practice is not to say that
it must do so. Every city or county commission in the Eleventh Circuit-
which includes Florida-can weigh the perceived benefits of sectarian ex-
pression against the costs thereof. It may then choose, on its own and free of
judicial compulsion, to decline to allow the utterance of sectarian prayers at
its meetings. Or, per Pelphrey III, it may choose to allow sectarian prayers,
taking care to avoid appearing to prefer one religion over others.92
92. Pelphrey III, 547 F.3d at 1271-72; see generally e.g., Atheists of Fla., Inc. v. City of
Lakeland, No. 8:10-cv-1538-T-1 7-MAP, 2012 WL 589588, (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2012).
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